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Introduction 
This is an experimental paper.  It attempts to explain foreign acquisitions by Indian multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) by reference to location specific factors in the source (home) and host countries.  
Dunning (1998) has re-emphasised the importance of location variables and our analysis tests this 
contention.  It seeks to measure the extent to which locational variables can explain foreign 
acquisitions. Our dependent variable is the value (and number) of foreign acquisitions by India firms 
2000-2007.  This is to be explained by location variables, examining the attraction of the host country 
by host and source country (India) variables and by a set of variables that describe the (physical, 
cultural and transaction cost) distance between India and the target country.  Our experiment therefore 
might be taken as testing the extent to which country specific advantages (CSAs) (Rugman 1981, 
Rugman & Verbeke 1992) or macroeconomic determinants (Kojima 1973, 1975, 1978) explain 
foreign acquisitions.  
This paper explores the source country specific attributes and host country specific location 
advantages that influence Indian multinationals making foreign acquisitions over the period 2000-
2007. India has become the second fastest growing economy in the world after China in the last two 
decades.  India has stood out among other developing countries of Asia not only because of recent 
significant increases in inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) but also as a result of its potential 
to be a large outward investor (UNCTAD, 2004) current annual outflows average more than US$ 13 
billion in recent years
i
. Internationalisation of Indian multinational firms (MNEs), historically 
undertaken through greenfield investments in the period that preceded gradual liberalisation of India‘s 
economy in 1991, has increasingly taken place through cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) since the late 1990s (Ramamurti and Singh, 2008).  
The nature, motives and trajectory of internationalisation pursued by Indian MNEs had been 
neglected but it has been investigated in some recent studies, prominently Pradhan (2007), Kumar 
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(2006) and Nayyer (2008). However, these studies are mainly descriptive due to the paucity and poor 
quality of the available disaggregated data. Using an exhaustive data set on foreign acquisitions by 
Indian MNEs from Thomson One Banker‘s over the period 2000 to 2007, this study is, to our 
knowledge, the first comprehensive attempt to model the determinants of FDI through foreign 
acquisitions by Indian MNEs. In this paper OFDI refers to acquisitions (acquisition of more than 10 
percent of equity becomes FDI by definition). India provides a good case to test the general 
theoretical explanation of FDI.  
General explanations of FDI especially the Eclectic Paradigm has been criticised on various grounds. 
The Eclectic Paradigm was developed in the context of success stories of resourceful Anglo 
American MNEs and therefore may not apply to the context of (often) resource-less emerging MNEs 
(Mathews 2006; Akyut 2006, and Bonaglia et al., 2006). However, we conjecture that Indian MNEs 
derive special advantages originating from source country characteristics, such as the opportunity to 
raise finance from domestic capital market, the appreciation of Indian Rupee against US Dollar, the 
proficiency of Indians over the English language, and policy liberalisation within Indian outward 
investment policy. We suggest that many Indian firms exploit these source country specific 
advantages in exploring foreign markets and acquiring advanced technology through foreign 
acquisitions. 
Trend and pattern of foreign acquisitions  
From the pre-liberalisation era until the beginning of 2001, Indian OFDI averaged less than 
$100million per year
ii
. However, policy changes in recent years have significantly increased OFDI 
activities, especially in 2003 when the absolute limit on OFDI was lifted. The average annual OFDI 
flow in the post-2003 period exceeded $15 billion per year. According to the Thomson One Banker 
dataset, Indian MNEs made 866 acquisitions of foreign firms, valued at $51 billion during the period 
2000 to 2007.  
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The concentration of such acquisitions in highly competitive and mature markets such as the UK and 
the USA is striking; about 40 percent in number and 54 percent in total value of such acquisitions 
took place in these two countries alone. This pattern is in sharp contrast with the pre-liberalisation 
period when a similar proportion of Indian OFDI targeted less developed countries (Lall, 1983).   
While developed countries may represent centres for knowledge assets for resource- and strategic 
asset-seeking FDI they also provide Indian MNEs with access to large and developed markets, 
marketing and distribution channels for well-established brands and wider product portfolios.  In 
addition, developed-country markets are generally mature markets typically served by MNEs, and 
this may creates incentives for Indian firms to use acquisitions, as opposed to greenfield investments, 
as the preferred entry mode. The high costs and disruptive impact of new capacity make acquisition 
of existing firms the more attractive entry mode. The sectoral breakdown of these acquisitions also 
reveals the significance of the skill-intensive industries such as high-tech products (software in 
particular) as well as the industrial, chemical and healthcare industries, accounting all together for 52 
percent of the number of acquisitions across the period.  It is in all these aspects that Indian OFDI 
differs from that of other emerging countries such as China.  While the established theoretical 
frameworks were developed in the context of OFDI by developed country firms, we examine their 
application to the context of OFDI by Indian MNEs.  The next section introduces these frameworks. 
Theoretical framework 
This section briefly examines the general theory of FDI and attempts to identify source and host 
country-specific factors which may have enabled Indian MNEs to make foreign acquisitions. 
General theoretical frameworks 
Hymer first conceived the general theory of FDI in 1960, later work by Buckley and Casson (1976, 
1985, and 2009), Rugman (1981, 1985, and 1996) and Dunning (1977, 1981) formalised the 
principles of FDI in the form of Eclectic Paradigm.  Accordingly, FDI theory is based on the 
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foundation of imperfection, internalisation and locational factors. Structural or market imperfections 
lead to generation of advantages (Kalfadellis and Gray, 2002) and transaction costs (Williamson, 
1981) provide the rationale for internalisation of activities by MNEs at foreign (advantageous) 
locations. The location aspect of FDI theory puts forwards four motives of FDI viz: market seeking, 
resource seeking, efficiency seeking and strategic- asset seeking. There can be other motives of FDI 
such as tax planning (Gurbert and Slemrod, 1998). 
Rugman (1981, 2006) resolves the Ownership, Location and Internalization (OLI) configuration 
within the Eclectic Paradigm into firm specific advantages (FSAs) and country specific advantages 
(CSAs) where ownership advantage (O) can be firm specific or country specific (FSA or CSA), 
location (L) is a host country specific advantage (CSA) and internalisation (I) is a firm specific (FSA) 
factor.  
In the Investment Development Path, the general theory envisages the role of inward FDI in 
promoting domestic economic growth (a home country macro economic factor) and through a series 
of continuous structural and institutional changes generate firm-specific ownership advantages at later 
stages of development, when firms learn by doing and consequently evolve into global firms 
(Dunning, 1981a, 1981b, 1986, 1993a; Dunning and Narula, 1996, Barry et al., 2003).  
The Uppsala model (also known as the Stages model) of internationalisation emphasises the 
importance of cultural factors.  Accordingly internationalisation takes place in stages with early 
investments happening in countries with a similar cultural background (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 
2009) as transaction costs increases with cultural distance.  
To measure cultural distance, Kogut and Singh (1988) developed an index based on Hofstede‘s 
(1980, 1983, 1991, 2003) empirical framework of national dimensions of culture. Hofstede‘s first four 
cultural dimensions are: 
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i. Power distance index (PDI) which signifies the extent of acceptance of the unequal 
distribution of power within organisations. It suggests that all societies are unequal; some 
more than others.  
ii. Uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) refers to a society‘s tolerance for uncertainty. Some 
societies try more to minimise uncertainties and are more deterministic than others. 
iii. Individualism (IDV) refers to a society‘s indifference towards integration, ties among 
individuals, strong cohesive groups, and the protection of others.   
iv. Masculinity (MAS) refers to the importance of values such as assertiveness and 
competitiveness, as compared to more feminine traits such as caring and cooperation.  
General theoretical frameworks have been built on the experience of successful MNEs from 
industrialised countries and therefore their applicability to emerging country multinationals has been 
constantly challenged (Mathews 2006, Aykut and Goldstein 2006) and we also do not expect a 
straightforward application of the general theoretical framework in case of India.  For instance, 
emerging MNEs possess soft and generic ownership advantages originating from home country and 
their motivations for undertaking FDI are unconventional. Market seeking FDI is undertaken to 
support foreign trade such as by the acquisition of distribution networks; strategic- asset seeking FDI 
aims at acquisition of advanced foreign technology and know-how; and the low cost characteristics of 
their home economies deters efficiency seeking FDI. 
Geographic and cultural distance may also not be important in the context of Indian OFDI as South 
Asia, traditionally India‘s home region, is the least economically integrated (Foreign Commonwealth 
Office, 2007) as well as one of the most politically unstable regions in the world.  High political risk 
in the region is due to various factors such as the lack of political harmony, internal and external 
conflicts, and religion in politics within the member countries. As a result, many Indian MNEs have 
made investment in geographically and culturally distant, politically stable and open economies such 
as the UK and the USA.  
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Special drivers of Indian outward direct investment 
We argue in this paper that Indian firms have access to a set of ownership advantages that originate 
from source country CSAs. This section briefly examines these CSAs which have enabled Indian 
MNEs to make foreign acquisitions.  
Institutional Factors: Studies in the field of international business (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Peng, 
2002; Scott, 2002; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Wright et. al., 2005) have explored the impact of 
institutional factors on FDI decisions.  Institutional factors can either act as barriers to foreign 
investors or as a facilitator for FDI.  Firms mould their OFDI strategies according to changing 
institutional frameworks.  Government support, in the form of subsidies, easy and simple norms of 
raising foreign funds can promote foreign investment by offsetting ownership and locational 
disadvantages abroad (Aggrawal and Agmon, 1990).  However, bureaucratic controls, lengthy 
administrative procedures, quotas, licenses and approvals for capital outflows can negatively impact 
the flow of foreign investment. Therefore, the institutional fabric and the degree of structural 
transformation can influence and determine OFDI by domestic firms (Lall, 1996; Duran and Ubeda, 
2001; Buckley, et. al. 2007).   
India‘s outward investment policy was gradually liberalised in the mid-1990s, but it is in the post-
2000 period when significant liberalization took place in OFDI policies (see table A-2).  In a recent 
FICCI study quoted in Nayyar (2008), FICCI observed that the liberalisation of the policy regime for 
outward investment in 2005 which allowed Indian firms to invest in entities abroad up to 200 per cent 
of their net worth in a year coincided with a sharp rise in cross-border acquisitions.  Similarly, further 
liberalisation in 2007 which raised the overseas investment limit to 400 percent of net worth in a year, 
also coincided with rising acquisitions both in numbers and in value. 
Domestic Capital Market: is a macroeconomic determinant strongly associated with FDI. FDI flows 
are positively associated with source country stock market as high stock valuations at home make 
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financing cheaper by reducing the cost of capital (Baker et. al., 2008).  Stock market valuations were 
also found to have significant explanatory power for US investments abroad (Barro, 1990) as MNEs 
make extensive use of their internal capital market to finance FDI projects (Herzer, 2008).  The 
association between stock market valuation and FDI is a very strong one.  As Baker puts it, ―the 
effect of source country valuations is stronger, in statistical terms, than any other determinant of FDI 
that we study, and to our knowledge may be the strongest effect on FDI yet documented in the 
literature.  This relationship is consistent with the cheap finance story‖ (Baker et al., 2008, pg. 22).  
 
India‘s capital market remained buoyant especially during the period 2003 to 2007 with significant 
inflows of global portfolio investments.  These conditions have enabled firms to raise equity from 
both primary and secondary markets. Interestingly, Indian firms raised most of the capital in India 
during this period and this also coincided with increasing levels of cross-border acquisitions by Indian 
MNEs. Thus, it is likely that the boom in the domestic capital might have enabled Indian firms to 
finance overseas acquisitions. 
 
Foreign Exchange Rate: International trade theory suggests that an appreciation of home currency 
makes the exports of goods and services more profitable while decreasing the cost of foreign 
investments.   Several studies (Aliber, 1970, Stevens, 1993, Blonigen, 1997) cite the exchange rate as 
a critical determinant of FDI. The currency area hypothesis by Aliber states ―the weaker the currency 
of a country the less likely it is that foreign firms will invest in that location. The crucial assumption 
of this theory is the existence of a bias in the capital market: the bias is assumed to arise because an 
income stream from a country with a weak currency is associated with an exchange rate risk and, 
therefore, an income stream is capitalised at a higher rate by the market when it is owned by a weak 
currency firm‖ (Chakrabarti, 2001, p. 100). Therefore, a relatively cheap home currency can make 
(overseas) valuations relatively costlier. 
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Strengthening of the Indian rupee against the US dollar in recent years made valuations of (overseas) 
target companies attractive. This could be an enabling factor behind recent acquisitions by Indian 
corporates. The exchange rate of the Indian rupee against the US dollar reached its peak in 2002 when 
the Indian rupee traded at an annual average rate of 48.6 against a US dollar. The Indian rupee later 
appreciated by more than 15 per cent against the US dollar by 2007 and the rupee traded at an annual 
average rate of 41.2 against the US dollar. This appreciation of the Indian rupee also coincided with 
the rising number of Indian acquisitions overseas. 
Language: The Stages model of internationalisation suggests that early investments tend to take place 
in countries with similar cultural backgrounds (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 2009). Language 
familiarity tends to be an important driver of  foreign direct investment (Doh et al., 2009, Akkermans, 
et al., 2008; Feely and Harzing, 2002) because it can considerably lower transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1981) and facilitate business exchange (Doh et. al, 2009). A common language 
subconsciously influences an individual‘s attitude and values (cultural accommodation) and can help 
bridge cultural and psychic distance (Bond and Yang, 1982; Doh et. al, 2009).  
 
India is culturally close to western countries, in particular the USA and the UK because of the English 
language.  India has adopted English as a second official language and the use of the English 
language is prevalent within the Indian business community, thus we anticipate that Indian firms 
would be more inclined to do business with English speaking countries. 
 
The determinants of foreign acquisitions by Indian multinationals 
We now propose various hypotheses derived from the general theory and the special drivers for 
Indian OFDI. Our first set of hypotheses is based on host country location-specific determinants, 
while the second set of hypotheses is based on source country-specific ownership advantages. Finally, 
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further hypotheses are formulated in relation to the geographical and cultural distance between host 
and source countries. 
Host country location specific determinants 
Host country location-specific determinants include general explanations including motivations for 
undertaking FDI and attributes of the host country such as political risk, corporate tax, openness of 
the host country, and geographical distance from the source country. 
Market seeking FDI: Many studies have found a positive relationship between FDI and the market 
size of the host country (see Chakrabarti, 2001). Market seeking FDI aims to service foreign market 
leveraging marketing skills and overseas distribution networks. Acquisition of local firms is often 
regarded as a quicker route relative to greenfield investments especially as Indian firms generally lack 
powerful and recognisable brand names (Sauvant, 2005).  In many cases, Indian MNEs have made 
foreign acquisitions for market seeking motives, for instance: Tata‘s acquisition of UK-based Tetley 
tea in 2000 and USA-based Good Earth tea in 2005; United Spirits acquisition of Glasgow based 
liquor company Whyte & Mackay Ltd in 2007. We therefore hypothesise the following: 
Hypothesis 1: The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are positively correlated 
with a host economy‘s market size. 
Resource seeking FDI: Resource seeking FDI aims at controlling and accessing the natural resources 
of a host economy. Internalisation theory asserts the importance of equity-based control in the 
exploitation of natural resources (Buckley et. al., 2007) made possible by acquisitions.  Although this 
strategic move to acquire natural resources occurs mainly in the manufacturing sector, and India is 
prominently a service driven economy, there are important instances where Indian MNEs have 
secured access to inputs to sustain their growth. Examples include acquisition of Russia‘s Sakhalin 
 10 
and Sudan‘s Greater Nile by ONGC; USA‘s General Chemicals by Tata Chemicals in 2008 and 
Corus by Tata Steel in 2006. Thus, we hypothesise the following: 
Hypothesis 2: The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are positively correlated 
with host country endowments of natural resources. 
Strategic- asset seeking FDI: India is a knowledge-based economy and a number of foreign 
acquisitions by Indian firms have been directed at the acquisition of knowledge and technology to 
complement their FSAs.  Pradhan (2007) argues that many software companies from India might 
have moved abroad to acquire knowledge, skill and technology not available at home. There are 
various examples of acquisitions in knowledge-based industries made to access foreign technology 
and know-how – for example, the acquisition of the small molecules business of Dowpharma, a 
Cambridge-based biotechnology company and Betapharm Arzneimittel GmbH of Germany by Dr 
Reddys Laboratories Ltd.  Thus, we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 3: The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are positively associated 
with host country endowments of knowledge-based assets. 
Political risk: Empirically, FDI has been shown to be sensitive to, and inversely correlated with, 
political risks in host countries (Harms, 2002).  Internalisation theory suggests that countries with 
high political risks will be served by arm length-servicing modes, such as exporting, licensing, and 
outsourcing (Buckley and Casson, 1981, 1999; Delios and Henisz, 2003) because FDI involves higher 
commitment and the existence of sunk costs.   However, high risk markets may offer higher returns 
and thus attract high levels of FDI. The role of high return can be controlled by inclusion of market 
related variables (Buckley et al., 2007).  
Hypothesis 4: The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are negatively associated 
with high levels of host countries‘ political risk. 
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Corporate tax: FDI decisions may be shaped by the nature of taxation provisions in host countries 
and their impact on the returns of investment projects (Swenson, 1994).  Various time-series studies 
report a positive correlation between higher after-tax returns and the amount of FDI (Desai et. al., 
2004).  Corporate tax rates play an important role in the location choices of MNEs as, all other things 
equal, firms prefer to locate activities in low statutory tax rate countries (Grubert and Slemrod, 1998).  
We therefore hypothesise:  
Hypothesis 5: The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are negatively associated 
with the host country corporate tax rate.  
Openness of host economy: Chakrabarti (2001) reports mixed evidence of the significance of trade 
openness of an economy (ratio of foreign trade to GDP) in determining FDI. Trade barriers mainly 
discourage trade and influence FDI decisions for instance the FDI‘s tariff jumping hypothesis 
(Asiedu, 2002) which means in economies characterized by low degrees of trade openness export 
may be replaced by FDI. In contrast, in economies with high degree of trade openness, FDI may 
replace exports, if the host country is geographically distant.  Nevertheless, geographical distance 
may still affect the choice of FDI as a foreign market servicing strategy relative to exporting and this 
can be controlled for by inclusion of geographical distance as a separate variable. Therefore, we 
hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 6:  The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are positively associated 
with the trade openness of the host economy.  
Source country-specific ownership advantages  
This section builds hypotheses for country specific variables (CSAs) emanating from the source 
country (India) based on general explanations such as inward FDI flows as well as special drivers 
such as India‘s outward FDI policy, foreign exchange rate, capital market, cultural affinity and use of 
the English language.   
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 Inward FDI flows: The IDP theory
iii
 suggests that capital flows in the form of FDI act as catalysts in 
the economic development and growth of the FDI recipient country and through a series of structural 
transformations, outward FDI activities by domestic firms start to occur (Dunning, 1981, 1986, 
1993b; Dunning and Narula, 1996, Barry et al., 2003).  However, in the context of India, OFDI flows 
have started to increase steeply in recent years, ―a surprising result for a poor country‖ (Ramamurti 
and Singh, 2008 p.1). Thus, we anticipate that outward FDI flows are not linked with inward FDI:  
Hypothesis 7: The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are not associated with 
India‘s inward FDI flows. 
Outward investment policy: Institutional changes are fundamental changes that can affect foreign 
investment trends and patterns.  We argue that changes in the outward investment policy of India 
have allowed Indian MNEs to undertake larger deals and consequently OFDI has been increasing 
significantly. A major liberalisation in outward investment policy took place in 2003, when the 
absolute limit on FDI was replaced by a relative limit and companies were allowed to invest 100 
percent of their net worth abroad.  We therefore hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 8: The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are positively associated 
with the liberalisation of India‘s overseas investment policies in 2003. 
Foreign exchange rate: An appreciation of a home country‘s currency discourages exports and 
encourages overseas investment.  The exchange rate is a critical determinant of OFDI (Aliber, 1970, 
Stevens, 1993, Blonigen, 1997). Recent appreciation of the Indian rupee may have impacted on the 
volume of foreign acquisitions.   Therefore, our hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 9:  The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are negatively associated 
 with depreciation of USD against INR.  
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Domestic capital market: A firm‘s stock market valuation is inversely correlated with its cost of 
capital (Baker et. al., 2008).  Increasing stock prices during the period of 2003 to 2007 also coincided 
with a similar trend in the foreign acquisitions by Indian companies. The high market valuation of 
Indian companies stocks in domestic capital market might have enabled Indian MNEs to finance their 
overseas acquisitions. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 10: The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are positively associated 
with the index of domestic stock market value. 
Language proximity: Recent studies (Akkermans, et al. 2008, Doh et al., 2009) have found language 
to be an important determinant of OFDI decisions. Competence in the English language may be 
another important source of advantage for Indian firms in English speaking countries. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is created. 
Hypothesis 11: The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are positively associated 
with the use of English in host countries. 
Distance between home and source country 
This section builds hypotheses covering cultural and geographical distance between the host and 
source country. 
Cultural affinity: Cultural affinity reduces transaction costs and therefore attracts FDI. The Uppsala 
or Stages model of internationalisation (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 2009)  suggests that MNEs 
internationalise gradually, initially to neighbouring countries, where physical and psychic distance are 
low and is complementary to locational explanations. The smaller these distances are, the lower are 
transaction costs likely to be. However, Indian OFDI‘s inclination towards the USA and UK and low 
levels of economic integration within the home region of South Asia (Foreign Commonwealth Office, 
 14 
2007) suggest that cultural distance might apply differently in the context of Indian OFDI. Hence we 
hypothesise:  
Hypothesis 12a: The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are not significantly 
associated with the host country‘s cultural distance from India. 
Hypothesis 12b: The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are not significantly 
associated with the host country‘s power distance index from India. 
Hypothesis 12c: The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are not significantly 
associated with the host country‘s difference in uncertainty avoidance index from India. 
Hypothesis 12d: The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are not significantly 
associated with the difference in host country‘s individualism index from India. 
Hypothesis 12e: The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are not significantly 
associated with the host country‘s difference in masculinity index from India. 
Geographical distance: Internalisation theory (Buckley and Cassons, 1981) suggests the importance 
of role that geographical distance between home and host countries has in OFDI decisions.  The 
higher the geographical distance between home and host countries the higher the transaction cost.  As 
a result FDI flows are expected to be negatively correlated with geographical distance between host 
and source country.  However, Indian OFDI through acquisitions tends to be targeted at gographically 
distant developed countries such as the USA and the UK.  Therefore, geographical and cultural 
distances are likely to apply differently in the context of Indian OFDI.  A physical distance variable is 
also needed to complement the cultural distance variable, to isolate its effect (Buckley et al., 2007). 
Therefore, we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 13:  The number and the value of foreign acquisitions are not significantly 
associated with the geographic distance between home and host countries.  
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Method and Data 
To test our hypotheses we have constructed two models based on two dependent variables, namely 
the number of foreign acquisitions abroad by Indian firms and the value of these acquisitions over the 
period 2000-2007. We match the dependent variable (acquisitions both in numbers and value) by year 
and by host country and collect independent variables (such as host country's GDP, political risk, 
patents applications and so on) by year for each host country to create a panel data set. We 
transformed both dependent and a set of independent variables into natural logarithms and derived a 
log-log linear model.  The log-log function enables the transformation of a non-linear relationship 
between our dependent and independent variables into a linear one.  It measures FDI elasticity with 
respect to our set of explanatory variables (Crown, 1998).  Thus, our models are as follow: 
(1) Ln(MAValueit) = a + b1 ln(GNIPCit) + b2 ln(RESOURCEit) + b3 ln(PATENTit) + b4 ln(POL_RISKit) + 
b5 ln(CTAXit) + c1 ln(INWARDFDIjt) + c2 ln(POLICY t-2) + c3 ln(SENSEXjt) + c4 ln(FERATEit) + c5 
ln(LANUGAGE) + d1 ln(GEOG_DISTi-j) + d2 ln(CULTURE_INDX i-j)+ d3In(PDIi-j) + d4 In (MASi-j) 
+ d5 In (UAIi-j) + d6 (INDi-j) 
(2) Ln(MANot) = a + b1 ln(GNIPCit) + b2 ln(RESOURCEit) + b3 ln(PATENTit) + b4 ln(POL_RISKit) + b5 
ln(CTAXit) + c1 ln(INWARDFDIjt) + c2 ln(POLICY t-2) + c3 ln(SENSEXjt) + c4 ln(FERATEit) + c5 
ln(LANGUAGE) + d1 ln(GEOG_DISTi-j) + d2 ln(CULTURE_INDX i-j)+ d3In(PDIi-j) + d4 In (MASi-j) 
+ d5 In (UAIi-j) + d6 (INDi-j) 
 
The definition and source of each variable in our models are highlighted in Table 1, which shows that 
our independent variables were sourced from reliable sources. Our model specification is also reliable 
because we covered both aspects of acquisitions: the number and the value. 
In the above regression models, i stand for host country; j stands for source country, t for time and i-j 
stand for the difference between home and host country.  Thus, MAValueit  refers to an acquisition in 
the ith country at time t.  Similarly, RESOURCEit refers to natural resources in the i
th country at time t, 
while SENSEXjt refers to domestic stock exchange index in the source country (India) at time t, 
GEOG_DISTi-j refers to geographical distance between home and host country and so on. 
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We use a dummy variable for LANUAGE (equal to 1 for country i if English is official or primary 
national language or national lingua franca, and 0 otherwise) and POLICY (equal to 1 for the period 
from 2000 to 2005 and 0 for period from 2006-2008). We utilise a lag of two years for policy 
variable. 
Political risk was measured using a weighted composite index which is made up of 12 different 
country specific variables such as internal, external conflicts; religion, military in politics; 
socioeconomic conditions; government stability; corruption, law and order; bureaucracy; and 
democratic accountability. The index used is comprehensive and covers social, economic, political 
and financial aspects of a country.  The higher the index, the lower is the risk and vice versa.  
The modified version of Kogut and Singh‘s index is used in various studies (e.g., Kale, 1991; Benito 
and Gripsrud, 1992; Agarwal, 1994; Barkema et al., 1996). The Kogut and Singh (1988) composite 
index on cultural distance is based on a formula which takes the difference between the index scores 
of the different countries relative to the USA. To use the index with reference to India we took the 
difference between various host countries relative to India. Thus, algebraically  
  
Where, CDj = cultural distance of i
th
 country from India 
 Iij = index of the i
th
 cultural dimension and the j
th
 country 
 Iid = index of the i
th
 cultural dimension of the India (d stands for India). 
 Vi = is the variance of the index of the i
th
 cultural dimension. 
The Reserve Bank of India does not compile data on cross border mergers and acquisitions.  As a 
result, we sourced annual data on foreign acquisitions by Indian firms from Thompson One Banker‘s 
M&A database.  We tested the database‘s exhaustive coverage by manually checking all reported 
acquisitions for a sample period of six months and were satisfied with the database coverage.  Our 
4 
CD j = ∑ {(Iij – Iid)
2 
/ Vi } /4 
 
I=1 
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dataset reveals that 866 acquisitions of firms based in 82 countries took place over the period 2000-
2007 by Indian firms. 
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
Results and Discussion 
The OLS (Ordinary Least Square) multiple regression results for both the models are presented in 
tables 2 and 3, where table 2 presents the results when acquisitions in number was the dependent 
variable and table 3 presents the results when acquisitions in value was the dependent variable. To 
check the collinearity table A1 presents the correlation matrix and the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
while tolerances are shown in tables 2 and 3. We found no evidence of multicollinearity within the 
data.  Our results appear robust and consistent across both models. 
Location specific attributes of the host country 
Our results show that host country market size (measured by per capita national income, i.e., GNIPC), 
endowment of knowledge assets (PATENTS), openness to trade (OPENESS), socio-political 
conditions (POL_RISK), are all significant and their signs are in accordance with expectations. Thus 
hypotheses 1, 3, 4 and 6 are supported. In contrast, the host country‘s natural resource endowment 
(RESOURCE), and corporate tax rate (CTAX) are insignificant. Thus, hypotheses 2 and 5 are not 
supported. We will now discuss what these results mean. 
We observed from the data that acquisitions by Indian companies are strongly concentrated in mature, 
well developed countries such as the USA and the UK. This suggests significant market seeking 
motives (Hypothesis 1).  Developed, high income-per-capita countries (GNIPC) provide Indian firms 
with strong incentives to establish a local presence, primarily because of the size of their markets. 
Acquisitions provide speedy entry in the foreign markets and obtaining well-established brands, 
marketing skills and marketing distribution networks overseas (Pradhan and Abraham, 2005). Brand 
building is one of the major desires of Indian companies when investing abroad (Sauvant, 2005). 
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Acquisition is also a more sensible way to acquire market share, especially in developed countries 
where markets are often highly competitive and saturated. 
The resource seeking (Hypothesis 2) motive for FDI is not significant while strategic- asset seeking 
(Hypothesis 3) is significant. This reflects the fact that India is a service driven economy rather than a 
manufacturing hub like China with its associated natural resource seeking motives (Buckley et al., 
2007). Indian companies are assessing foreign technology in order to build their competitive edge in 
the world economy. However, the current Indian government has realised that manufacturing is 
necessary for overall growth and we might expect to see resource seeking FDI gaining significance in 
the future. 
Political risk (POL_RISK) (Hypotheses 4) was also significant and had the expected positive sign.  
The higher the political risk index (i.e., low political risk), the higher is the investment. Our argument 
is that India has poor track record on various social, economic and political indicators of political 
risks, and therefore, Indian MNEs are looking for safe and peaceful places to conduct business. Our 
argument can also be construed to mean that Indian companies are pushed by domestic factors to 
internationalise and this argument is subject to further tests. Thus, Indian MNEs perceive and behave 
towards political risk in the manner that industrially advanced countries MNEs do and therefore, 
OFDI decisions of Indian MNEs are significantly affected by the political risk in host countries.  
Our last locational determinant, corporate tax rates in host countries (CTAX) (Hypothesis 5), appears 
to be insignificant. Arguably, there should be a negative relation between OFDI and corporate 
taxation in the host country as companies generally wish to avoid tax.  However, this effect may only 
be apparent when multinationals have successfully started operating and are making significant 
profits. Indian multinationals and their FDI are still new phenomena, their main objective during their 
initial stages is to attain market share and nurture the business rather than to start minimising the tax 
liability, which may be their strategy in the longer run.  
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Openness of the host economy (OPENNESS) (Hypothesis 6) was significant with the expected 
negative sign. This supports the tariff jumping proposition (Asiedu, 2002), it means Indian countries 
are avoiding anti-dumping duties, in the less open economies, by undertaking FDI.  
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
Country specific advantages of the source country 
Having discussed the host country specific factors, we now examine ownership advantages 
originating from within the source country. In order to evaluate country-specific sources of 
advantages we considered five sets of determinants: foreign exchange rate (FERATE) of the Indian 
rupee against the US dollar, the inward flow of foreign direct investment (INWARD_FDI), the 
liberalisation of India‘s outward investment policy (POLICY), increases in the domestic capital 
market (SENSEX) and proficiency in English (LANGUAGE). We find foreign exchange rate 
(FERATE), domestic stock market (SENSEX), and the language factor (LANGUAGE) are significant 
with positive signs, as expected. Hypotheses 9, 10 and 11 are supported. Hypothesis 8 is also 
supported where the lags in policy liberalisation (POLICY) in outward investment policy are also 
found to be significant but the sign with acquisitions value as dependent variable is negative. Inflows 
of inward FDI (INFDI) (Hypothesis 7) was not found to be significant. These results are now 
discussed in more detail.   
The IDP theory suggests that inward flows of FDI indirectly boost outward flows of FDI through a 
series of economic and institutional transformations.  In this study we limited our focus to FDI 
inflows, since the objective of paper was not to test the IDP theory. We found that India‘s inward FDI 
flows (Hypothesis 7) are not significant in explaining outward FDI through acquisitions.  This may be 
because India is untypical of developing economies with large FDI outflows in recent years relative to 
the size of its inflows for a country at the early stages of its development path.   
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In this study we have argued that the policy changes in 2003 (POLICY) (Hypothesis 8) is likely to 
have encouraged Indian firms to undertake OFDI. Table 2 shows that acquisition numbers do respond 
in the predicted fashion (positive and significant) but Table 3 shows that the results are significant 
(with an incorrect sign) for acquisition value. Further tests (not reported have) found that a three year 
lag produced a significant sign. Further research (following Buckley et al., 2003) is required to 
investigate the effect of policy lags on OFDI. In addition, the inevitably start devotion of this study 
restricts our ability to fully explore the impact of policy liberalisation. 
India‘s main stock exchange, the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) index is called Sensex. We found 
that foreign acquisitions had a significant positive relation with the Sensex (Hypothesis 9). We also 
observed from the BSE data that most of the capital was acquired by Indian companies during the 
period 2003-2007 when the domestic stock market was booming. Thus, it is likely that Indian 
companies might have used the capital raised during the domestic capital market boom to fund these 
foreign acquisitions. 
Appreciation of Indian rupee, especially during the 2003-2007, resulted in a favourable foreign 
exchange rate (FERATE) (Hypothesis 10). Since the exchange rate (direct quote) used for this paper 
was INR per USD, a negative sign supports our hypothesis. The significance of foreign exchange rate 
suggests that the strengthening of Indian rupee has made valuations of foreign target companies more 
attractive and this has increased the purchasing power of Indian companies when making acquisitions 
abroad. Thus, strengthening of the Indian Rupee against the US dollar appears to have encouraged 
Indian firms to undertake foreign acquisitions away from home because it has made valuations of 
foreign companies more attractive, when expressed in the home-country currency.   
Among the cultural variables under investigation, we find proficiency of Indians in English 
(LANGUAGE) (Hypothesis 11) acts as a country specific advantage. English is the second official 
language in India and undoubtedly first in the private sector business community. Proficiency in the 
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English language acts as an intangible asset for many Indians businesses when operating in countries 
where English is either the first or second official language. Strong significance with a positive sign 
for the language factor suggests Indian companies prefer to do business with English speaking 
partners.  
Distance variables 
For the distance variable we choose geographic distance (GEOG_DIST), cultural distance 
(CULTURE_INDEX) and differences in Hofstede‘s four dimensions of national culture (PDI, UAI, 
IND, MAS) between the source and host country. This covers hypotheses 12a to 12e and 13, and we 
find both geographic and cultural distances as expected are largely insignificant.  
Geographic distance (Hypothesis 13) affects the transaction costs and therefore is generally an 
important factor in internalisation. However, as expected, in the case of India this factor was found 
insignificant. The insignificance of geographic distance is supportive of the bitter rivalries within the 
South-Asia region especially among India, China and Pakistan that have made this region one of the 
least integrated (Foreign Commonwealth Office, 2007). Despite the fact that these countries are 
geographically close, foreign investment does not flow significantly to these countries; rather it goes 
to more distant western countries. 
Finally, among other cultural variables (Hypothesis12a to 12e), Kogut and Singh‘s (1988) cultural 
distance index (CULTURE_INDEX) and Hofstede‘s (1983) power distance index (PDI) were found 
to be insignificant, while masculinity (MAS) showed mixed results; significant with respect to value 
of acquisitions and non-significant with respect to numbers. We compute the relative distance with 
respect to India, which means Indian firms appear able to operate in countries which have a different 
power distance when compared with India. However, Hofstede‘s (1983) index on individuality (IND) 
and uncertainty avoidance (UAI) were significant. In this respect it is argued that Indian 
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multinationals are able to operate in countries with high levels of individualism, typically western 
societies. However, in contrast, as argued before, Indian multinationals are still in their infancy in 
terms of internationalisation and therefore uncertainty avoidance may be their aim, and the 
significance of political risk indicates something similar. Thus, Indian multinationals seeks to invest 
in countries which have lower uncertainties and ambiguities.  
Conclusion 
This paper is a first attempt to model the determinants of Indian OFDI through acquisitions by 
reference to location or country-specific variables.  Using a panel dataset on foreign acquisitions by 
Indian MNEs in 82 countries over the period 2000-2007 we tested a number of hypotheses.  We find 
that Indian OFDI through cross-border acquisitions has novel, idiosyncratic and conventional 
dimensions.  While we found that Indian acquisitions abroad were primarily motivated by market-
seeking purposes and strategic- asset seeking objectives, but we did not find evidence of resource 
seeking FDI.  These results may reflect the economic configuration of the Indian economy, which is 
largely knowledge and service based and therefore Indian MNES are seeking strategic assets such as 
knowledge and technological assets rather than natural resources. 
Among host country location variables, host countries‘ with lower political risk and countries with 
high uncertainty avoidance are preferred which shows the risk aversive nature of Indian 
multinationals. This may be because Indian multinationals are newly internationalising. The 
insignificance of host countries corporate tax rates indicates that Indian MNEs are new players trying 
to establish themselves in world economy, looking for markets and strategic-assets rather than 
minimise tax which may be a longer term strategy.  
Indian firms seem to be driven by country specific factors such as the appreciation of the Indian rupee 
against the US dollar which had made the valuation of foreign companies cheaper and this was 
augmented by rising valuations in the home stock market which appears to have helped fund such 
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acquisitions. English language proficiency has apparently contributed to such investments, since it 
makes Indian firms more effective in world markets, particularly in English speaking countries. This 
may explain why the USA and the UK are the two largest host countries for Indian MNEs.  
Low integration within the South-Asia region and geographic distance seems to have pushed OFDI 
from India to developed countries such as UK and USA. This is certainly supported by other factors 
such as the English language factor, low political risk, and endowment of knowledge-assets as well as 
large market size.  
Institutional changes, especially changes in outward FDI policy in 2003, have boosted outflows of 
FDI with a lag of two to three years, but OFDI is not primarily driven by rising inflows of FDI; there 
are different motives for such FDI such as market and strategic-asset seeking goals. However, this 
should be further tested with the addition of data beyond 2007.  Similarly, we anticipate that resource-
seeking motives could become significant with the addition of more recent data as the Indian 
government emphasises the development of the manufacturing sector. Finally, further research 
adopting a qualitative approach would be useful in assessing the results reported here. 
This study suggests the need to examine the relationship between country and firm specific 
advantages and the methods by which firms can convert CSAs into FSAs from which they can extract 
returns. There is also a need to explore the impact of lag structure of some of the key explanatory 
variables, notably policy, on subsequent OFDI. The study is unable to examine post merger success 
and strategies with regard to the integration of acquired foreign assets into the Indian firm. This is a 
suitable subject for further work and is of vital importance. The success of Indian OFDI is dependent 
not only on making the right acquisitions, but also their future management.   
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Table 1: Variables and Data Sources 
 
Variable (General) Proxies Expected 
Sign 
Theoretical 
Justification 
Data Source 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
Value of Foreign Acquisitions 
by Indian firms 
(MAValue) 
 
Number of Foreign 
Acquisitions by Indian firms 
(MANo) 
 
 
 
Dependent variables 
 
 
 
Thomson One Banker 
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
 V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
Market Size of Host Country  
(GNIPC) Hypothesis 1 
GDP and Per Capita  
GDP 
 
+ Market Seeking  World Bank Development 
Indicator  
Natural Resource Endowment 
of Host Country  
(RESOURCE) Hypothesis 2 
Ratio of Ore and Metal 
Exports to Merchandise 
Exports of 
Host Country 
+ Resource Seeking 
(Leverage)  
World Bank Development 
Indicator  
Endowment of Knowledge 
Based Asset of Host Country  
(PATENT) Hypothesis 3 
Yearly Patent 
Registration by Residents 
in Host Country 
+ Resource Seeking 
(Leverage)  
World Intellectual 
Property Organisation  
Political Risk  
(POL_RISK) Hypothesis 4 
Host country‘s political 
risk rating 
- Transaction Cost  International 
Country Risk Guide 
Corporate Tax 
(CTAX) Hypothesis 5 
Corporate Tax Rates in 
Host Country 
- Transaction Cost  OECD: Centre for Tax 
Policy and Administration  
Economy Openness of Host 
Country 
(OPENNESS) Hypothesis 6 
Ratio of Foreign Trade to 
GDP 
+ Transaction Cost 
World Bank Development 
Indicator 
S
o
u
rc
e 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
(C
S
A
) 
Direct Capital Flow 
(INWARDFDI)  
Hypothesis 7 
Inward FDI in home 
country 
+ IDP DIPP 
Outward Investment Policy 
Liberalisation 
(POLICY) Hypothesis 8 
Time dummy variable  + Institutional Factors Reserve Bank of India 
Domestic Capital Market  
(SENSEX) Hypothesis 9 
Bombay Stock Exchange 
Index 
+ Special Variable 
(Ownership 
Advantage) 
Bombay Stock Exchange  
Exchange Rate 
(FERATE) Hypothesis 10 
Host country official 
annual average exchange 
rate against dollar 
- Macro Economic 
Factors  
World Bank Development 
Indicator 
English Speaking Host 
Country (LANGUAGE) 
Hypothesis 11 
Binary Code + Uppsala Model  Krysstal.Com  
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 D
is
ta
n
ce
  
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
Cultural Distance Index 
(CULTURE_INDEX) 
Hypothesis 12a 
 Kogut and Singh CD 
Index _ 
Uppsala Model Kogut and Singh (1988) 
National Cultural  
(PDI, UAI, IND, MAS) 
Hypothesis 12b, 12c, 12d, 12e 
Hofstede‘s National 
Cultural Dimensions _ 
 
Uppsala Model Hofstede (2002) 
Geographical Distance of Host 
country (GEOG_DIST) 
Hypothesis 13 
Distance between the 
capitals of host and home 
country 
 
_ 
Transaction Cost Calculated using 
www.geobytes.com 
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Table 2: Results for Acquation Number 
Variables 
Standardized Coefficients Beta Collinearity Statistics 
(Significance) Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -22.407 -22.626 -28.099 -29.656 -29.761 -33.210 -33.009     
  (.198) (.193) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)     
LGNIPC .095 .093 .093 .098 .102 .106 .100 .447 2.237 
  (.076)* (.080)* (.081)* (.057)* (.046)** (.039)** (.049)**     
LPOL_RISK .117 .117 .117 .113 .126 .128 .134 .485 2.061 
  (.023)** (.023)** (.023)** (.025)** (.008)*** (.007)*** (.005)***     
LFERATE -.125 -.122 -.122 -.123 -.116 -.115 -.114 .682 1.466 
  (.004)*** (.004)*** (.004)*** (.004)*** (.005)*** (.005)*** (.006)***     
LSENSEX .206 .209 .199 .201 .201 .242 .243 .149 6.723 
  (.026)** (.024)** (.024)** (.023)** (.023)** (.003)*** (.003)***     
LOPENNESS -.147 -.146 -.145 -.141 -.137 -.137 -.132 .589 1.697 
  (.002)*** (.002)*** (.002)*** (.002)*** (.003)*** (.002)*** (.003)***     
LIDV .158 .156 .156 .154 .157 .162 .154 .836 1.196 
  (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)***     
LMAS -.054 -.060 -.060 -.061 -.062 -.058 -.070 .681 1.468 
  (.215) (.124) (.124) (.116) (.111) (.134) (.062)*     
LUAI .079 .082 .082 .087 .089 .088 .083 .768 1.303 
  (.052)* (.042)** (.042)** (.025)** (.021)** (.022)** (.030)**     
LPATENT .129 .130 .131 .128 .130 .137 .132 .646 1.548 
  (.004)*** (.004)*** (.003)*** (.003)*** (.003)*** (.002)*** (.002)***     
LANGUAGE .106 .106 .106 .108 .104 .102 .098 .811 1.233 
  (.008)*** (.008)*** (.008)*** (.006)*** (.008)*** (.009)*** (.012)***     
POLICY 
(Dummy) 
.203 .201 .188 .187 .192 .148 .148 .151 6.632 
  (.028)** (.029)** (.027)** (.028)** (.024)** (.050)** (.050)**     
LCULTURE_IN
DEX 
-.051 -.053 -.053 -.055 -.054 -.053 
  
.832 1.201 
  (.195) (.165) (.165) (.148) (.154) (.162)       
LCTAX .045 .044 .042 .040 .047    .682 1.466 
  (.294) (.308) (.326) (.346) (.255)         
LRESORUCES .045 .045 .044 .039    .522 1.917 
  (.360) (.367) (.370) (.413)           
LGEOG_DIST -.017 -.019 -.018     .690 1.448 
  (.695) (.662) (.669)             
LINWARDFDI -.026 -.025      .252 3.961 
  (.718) (.724)               
LPDI -.015        .600 1.667 
  (.750)                 
R Square .303 .303 .303 0.301 .300 .298 .295     
Number 569 569 569 569 569 569 569     
F Value 13.756 14.634 15.626 16.753 18.001 19.383 20.931   
** Significant at 1 %; ** significant at 5%;*significant at 1% 
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Table 3: Results for Acquation Value 
*** Significant at 1 %; ** significant at 5%;*significant at 1% 
Variables 
Standardized Coefficients Beta 
(Significance) 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -74.77 -74.76 -74.61 -74.08 -75.97 -71.56 -69.29 -70.60     
  (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)     
LSENSEX .331 .331 .331 .332 .333 .335 .290 .303 .438 2.281 
  (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)***     
LIDV .162 .162 .158 .153 .156 .164 .163 .167 .485 2.062 
  (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)***     
LFERATE -.141 -.141 -.135 -.134 -.126 -.121 -.114 -.107 .674 1.484 
  (.001)*** (.001)*** (.001)*** (.002)*** (.002)*** (.003)*** (.005)*** (.009)***     
LOPENNESS -.141 -.141 -.140 -.137 -.129 -.138 -.119 -.097 .235 4.255 
  (.003)*** (.003)*** (.004)*** (.004)*** (.006)*** (.003)*** (.008)*** (.022)**     
LANGUAGE .116 .116 .115 .111 .107 .100 .097 .092 .552 1.811 
  (.004)*** (.003)*** (.004)*** (.005)*** (.006)*** (.010)*** (.012)*** (.017)***     
LPATENT .128 .128 .130 .127 .130 .141 .158 .172 .836 1.196 
  (.005)*** (.005)*** (.004)*** (.005)*** (.004)*** (.001)*** (.000)*** (.000)***     
LUAI .079 .079 .083 .078 .084 .071 .069 .071 .679 1.473 
  (.053)* (.052)* (.039)** (.050)** (.034)** (.064)* (.069)* (.063)*     
LMAS -.080 -.080 -.090 -.099 -.100 -.095 -.097 -.105 .768 1.303 
  (.064)* (.064)* (.019)* (.009)*** (.008)*** (.012)*** (.010)*** (.005)***     
LPOL_RISK .087 .087 .087 .093 .106 .108 .114 .148 .616 1.623 
  (.089)* (.089)* (.088)* (.066)* (.030)** (.101) (.084)* (.000)*     
LINWARD 
FDI 
.106 .106 .106 .106 .108 .108 .114 .116  .809 1.235 
  (.108) (.108) (.107) (.106) (.099)* (.101) (.084) (.077)      
LGNIPC .097 .097 .094 .089 .098 .084 .072  .480 2.083 
  (.071)* (.070)* (.078)* (.093)* (.063)* (.101) (.158)      
POLICY 
(Dummy) 
-.085 -.085 -.084 -.084 -.080 -.079   .832 1.201 
  (.097)* (.097)* (.101) (.102) (.117) (.120)       
LGEOG_DIS
T 
.050 .051 .047 .043 .054    .878 1.139 
  (.239) (.235) (.261) (.310) (.183)        
LRESOURC
ES 
.050 .051 .049 .049        .521 1.921 
  (.307) (.297) (.313) (.313)         
LCULTURE
_INDEX 
-.033 -.033 -.037      .692 1.446 
  (.397) (.396) (.330)             
LPDI -.025 -.025             .293 3.418 
  (.589) (.591)                 
LCTAX .002        .602 1.662 
  (.955) 
 
          
R Square .303 .303 .303 0.301 .300 .298 .295 .292     
Number 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569     
F Value 14.092 15.000 16.001 17.078 18.312 19.663 21.176 23.053   
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 : Correlation Matrix 
 
  
LGNIPC 
LReso- 
urces 
LPol 
Risk LCTax LForex LInFDI LSensex 
LGeog 
Distance 
Lopen 
ness 
LCulture 
Index LPDI LIDV LMAS LUAI LPatent Language 
Policy 
Lib 
LMANo .167 .135 .146 .074 -.115 .338 .389 .028 -.174 .003 .010 .227 -.096 .155 .092 .037 .373 
LMAVaue .145 .129 .124 .074 -.130 .359 .387 .076 -.183 .022 .006 .234 -.115 .147 .099 .047 .218 
LGNIPC 1.000 .500 .614 .142 .270 .036 .046 -.044 .449 -.015 -.012 .103 -.132 .126 .275 -.150 .038 
LResource .500 1.000 .573 .243 .323 .046 .047 .268 .319 -.005 .048 .140 -.029 .145 .192 -.186 .040 
LPolrisk .614 .573 1.000 .116 .330 .001 .001 .191 .348 -.091 -.018 .075 -.063 .106 .198 -.178 .000 
LCTax .142 .243 .116 1.000 .002 -.001 .032 .189 .017 .072 .191 .142 .098 .026 .156 -.062 -.178 
LForex .270 .323 .330 .002 1.000 -.059 -.072 .058 .283 -.067 -.147 -.021 .014 -.077 -.106 .142 -.046 
LInFDI .036 .046 .001 -.001 -.059 1.000 .839 .002 -.317 .000 .001 .000 -.001 -.001 -.282 -.002 .827 
LSensex .046 .047 .001 .032 -.072 .839 1.000 .002 -.336 .000 .000 .000 -.001 -.001 -.316 -.001 .880 
LGeogDis -.044 .268 .191 .189 .058 .002 .002 1.000 -.102 .137 .280 .160 .189 -.167 .150 -.114 .001 
Lopenness .449 .319 .348 .017 .283 -.317 -.336 -.102 1.000 -.099 -.089 -.057 -.056 -.019 .239 -.048 -.270 
LCDIndex -.015 -.005 -.091 .072 -.067 .000 .000 .137 -.099 1.000 .310 .188 .218 .081 .139 .041 .000 
LPDI -.012 .048 -.018 .191 -.147 .001 .000 .280 -.089 .310 1.000 .235 .485 -.174 .099 -.044 .000 
LIDV .103 .140 .075 .142 -.021 .000 .000 .160 -.057 .188 .235 1.000 .032 .132 .228 .039 .000 
LMAS -.132 -.029 -.063 .098 .014 -.001 -.001 .189 -.056 .218 .485 .032 1.000 -.141 .068 -.122 -.001 
LUAI .126 .145 .106 .026 -.077 -.001 -.001 -.167 -.019 .081 -.174 .132 -.141 1.000 .192 -.211 -.001 
LPatent .275 .192 .198 .156 -.106 -.282 -.316 .150 .239 .139 .099 .228 .068 .192 1.000 -.067 -.251 
Language -.150 -.186 -.178 -.062 .142 -.002 -.001 -.114 -.048 .041 -.044 .039 -.122 -.211 -.067 1.000 -.001 
PolicyLib .038 .040 .000 -.178 -.046 .827 .880 .001 -.270 .000 .000 .000 -.001 -.001 -.251 -.001 1.000 
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Table A2 : India's Overseas Investment: Major Liberalisation Measures 
December 1969: The Government of India issued first formal guidelines for overseas direct investment. Under 
this, Indian parties were permitted minority participation in turnkey projects involving no cash remittances. 
 
April 1978: An Inter-Ministerial Committee in the Ministry of Commerce was set up to clear proposals for 
overseas investments. There was a requirement for repatriation of 50 per cent dividend from declared profits. 
 
1992: An Automatic Route for overseas investments was introduced and cash remittances were allowed for the 
first time. The total value was restricted to US $ 2 million with a cash component not exceeding US $ 0.5 
million in a block of 3 years. 
 
1995: The work relating to overseas investment was transferred from Ministry of Commerce to RBI to provide 
a single window. In terms of the policy, a fast track route was introduced where limits were raised from US $ 2 
million to US $ 4 million and linked to average export earnings of the preceding three years. Cash remittance 
continued to be restricted to US $ 0.5 million. Beyond US $ 4 million, proposals were considered under 
Approval Route at the Special Committee level. 
 
March 1997: Exchange earners other than exporters were also brought under the fast track route. Indian 
promoters were allowed to set up second and subsequent generation companies, provided the first generation 
company was set up under the fast track route. 
 
2000: The introduction of FEMA brought about significant policy liberalisation. The limit for investment up to 
US $ 50 million, which was earlier available in a block of three years, made available annually without any 
profitability condition. Companies were allowed to invest 100 per cent of the proceeds of their ADR/GDR 
issues for acquisitions of foreign companies and direct investments in JVs and WOSs. 
 
March 2002: Automatic route was further liberalised wherein Indian parties investing in JVs/WOSs outside 
India were permitted to invest an amount not exceeding US $ 100 million as against the earlier limit of US $ 50 
million in a financial year. Also the investments under the automatic route could be funded by withdrawal of 
foreign exchange from an authorised dealer (AD) not exceeding 50 per cent of the net worth of the Indian party. 
 
March 2003: Automatic route was significantly liberalised to enable Indian parties to fund to the extent of 100 
per cent of their net worth. 
 
February 2004: With a view to enabling Indian corporates to become global players by facilitating their 
overseas direct investment, permitted end-use for external commercial borrowing (ECB) was enlarged to 
include overseas direct investment in JVs/WOSs. This would facilitate corporates to undertake fresh investment 
or expansion of existing JV/WOS including mergers and acquisitions abroad by harnessing resources at globally 
competitive rates. 
 
May 2005: With a view to promoting Indian investment abroad and to enable Indian companies to reap the 
benefits of globalisation, the ceiling of investment by Indian entities was revised from 100 per cent of net worth 
to 200 per cent of the net worth of the investing company under the automatic route for overseas investment. 
 
June 2007:  The limit of 200 per cent of the net worth of the Indian party was enhanced to 300 per cent of the 
net worth under automatic route (200 per cent in case of registered partnership firms). 
 
September 2007: The limit of 300 per cent of the net worth of the Indian party was further enhanced to 400 per 
cent of the net worth of the Indian party. 
 
June 2008:  Indian companies have been allowed to invest in excess of 400 per cent of their net worth as on the 
date of the last audited balance sheet in the energy and natural resources sectors, such as oil, gas, coal and 
mineral ores.  The investment in excess of 400 per cent of the net worth shall be made only with the prior 
approval of the Reserve Bank.  
Source: Authors compilation from Reserve Bank of India bulletins and Gopinath S. (2007) 
 29 
References 
 
Agarwal, R. and Agmon, T. (1990). The international success of developing country firms: role of 
government-directed comparative advantage, Management International Review, 30/2, 163-180. 
Agarwal, S. (1994). Socio-cultural distance and the choice of joint ventures: a contingency 
perspective, Journal of International Marketing, 2/2, 63-80. 
Akkermans, D.; Harzing, A.W.K.; Witteloostuijn, A. van (2008) Cultural Imprinting and Language 
Priming. Competitive versus Cooperative Behavior in a Prisoner‘s Dilemma Game, conference 
proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the UK Chapter of the AIB, Portsmouth, 28-29 March. 
Akyut, D. and Goldstein A. (2006). Developing country multinationals: South-south investment 
comes of age, OECD Development Centre, WP 257, 1-42. 
Aliber, R. Z. (1970). A theory of direct foreign investment‖. In: C. Kindleberger (eds.), The 
International Corporation: A Symposium, Cambridge: MIT Press: 17–34. 
Asiedu, E. (2002). On determinants of foreign direct investments to developing countries: Is 
Africa different? World Development, 30(11), p. 107-119. 
Baker, M. C., Fritz F. and Wurgler J. (2008). Multinationals as arbitrageurs: The effect of stock 
market valuations on FDI, The Review of Financial Services, RFS advance access, March 2008. 
Balasubramanyam, V.N. and Forsans N. (2009) Internationalisation Drivers of Indian Multinational 
Firms, Asian Business & Management, forthcoming 
Barkema, H., Bell, J. and Pennings, J. (1996). Foreign entry, cultural barriers, and learning, Strategic 
Management Journal, 17, 151-166. 
Barro, R. J. (1990). The Stock Market and Investment, The Review of Financial Studies, 3/1, pp. 115-
131.  
Barry, F., Gorg, H. and McDowell, A. (2003). Outward FDI and the investment development path of 
a late-industrializing economy: Evidence from Ireland, Regional Studies, 37/4, 341- 349.  
Benito, G. and Gripsrud, G. (1992). The expansion of foreign direct investment: discrete rational 
location choices or a cultural learning process?, Journal of International Business Studies, 23/3, 461-
476. 
Blonigen, B. A. (1997). Firm-specific assets and the link between exchange rates and foreign direct 
investment, American Economic Review, 87/3, 447–465. 
Bond, M. H. and Yang, K. –S. (1982), Ethinic Affirmation versus Cross cultural accommodation: The 
variable impact of questionnaire language on Chinese bilinguals from Hong Kong, Jounral of Cross-
Cultural Psychology, 13: 169-185. 
 30 
Bond, Michael H. (1988). Finding universal dimensions of individual variation in multicultural 
studies of values: The rokeach and Chinese value surveys, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 55/6, 1009-1015. 
Bongalia, F., Goldstein A. and Mathews J. (2006). Accelerated internationalisation by emerging 
multinationals: The case of white goods sector, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 1485, 1-37. 
Buckley, P. J., and Casson, M., (1981). The optimal timing of a foreign direct investment, Economic 
Journal, 91/361, 75–87. 
Buckley, P. J., and Casson, M., (1999). A theory of international operations. In P. J. Buckley and P. 
N. Ghauri (eds.) The internationalization process of the firm: a reader, 2nd edn., London: Thomson, 
55–60. 
Buckley, P. J., and Hashai N. (2008). Formalizing internationalisation in the eclectic paradigm, 
Journal of International Business Studies, 40/1, 1-13. 
Buckley, P. J., Casson, M., (1976). The future of multinational enterprise, London: McMillan. 
Buckley, P. J., Casson, M., (1985). The economic theory of the multinational enterprise, London: 
McMillan. 
Buckley, P. J., Casson, M., (2009). The internalisation theory of the multinational enterprise: A 
review of the progress of a research agenda after 30 years, Journal of International Business Studies, 
40, 1563-1580. 
Buckley, P. J., Jeremy, C. L., Cross, A. R., Liu, X., Voss, H., Zheng, P., (2007). The determinants of 
Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment, Journal of International Business Studies, 38, 499-518. 
Chakrabarti, A., (2001). The determinants of foreign direct investment: sensitivity analyses of cross-
country regressions, Kyklos, 54, 89-114. 
Delios, A. and Henisz, W.J. (2003). Policy uncertainty and the sequence of entry by Japanese firms, 
1980-1998, Journal of International Business Studies, 34/3, 227-41. 
Desai M. A., Fritz F., and Hines, J. R. (2004). FDI in a world of multiple taxes, Journal of Public 
Economics, 88, 2727-2744. 
Doh, Jonathan P, Bunyaratavej, K. and Hahn, E. D. (2009), Separable but not equal: The location 
determinants of discrete services offshoring activities, Journal of International Business Studies, 40, 
926–943. 
Dunning, J. H. (1998). Location and the multinational enterprise: A neglected factor? ―Journal of 
International Business Studies,‖ 29(1): 461 – 491. 
Dunning, J. H., (1977). Trade, location of economic activity and MNE: A search for an eclectic 
approach. In B. Ohlin, P. O. Hesselborn, P. J. Wijkmann, (Eds.), The International Allocation of 
Economic Activity, London: McMillan. 
 31 
Dunning, J. H., (1981). International production and the multinational enterprise, London: Allen and 
Unwin. 
Dunning, J. H., (1986). The Investment Development Cycle Revisited, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 
122: 667–77. 
Dunning, J. H., (1993). Multinational enterprise and the global economy, Reading: Addison Wesley. 
Dunning, J. H., and Narual R., (1996). The Investment Development Path Revisited: Some Emerging 
Issues. In J.H. Dunning and R. Narula (eds.) Foreign Direct Investment and Governments: Catalysts 
for Economic Restructuring, London and New York: Routledge, 1-41. 
Duran, J. J. and Ubeda F. (2001). The investment development path: A new empirical approach and 
some theoretical issues, Transnational Corporation, 10/2, Geneva: UNCTAD.  
Feely, A. J., and Harzing, A. W. K. (2002). Forgotten and neglected – language: The orphan of 
international business research. Paper accepted for presentation at the 62nd annual meeting of the 
Academy of Management, Denver, August 9th–14th. 
Foreign Commonwealth Office (2007). Fourth report of the foreign affairs committee session 2006-
07: South Asia response of the secretary of state for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, UK. 
Grubert H., & Slemrod J., (1998). The effect of taxes on investment and income shifting to Puerto 
Rico, The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, 80/3, 365-373. 
Harms P. (2002). Do civil and political repression really boost foreign direct investments?, Economic 
Inquiry, 40, 651-663. 
Herzer, D., (2008). The long-run relationship between outward FDI and domestic output: Evidence 
from panel data, Economic Letters, 100,146-149. 
Hofstede, G.,  (2003). Culture's consequences: comparing values, behaviours, institutions, and 
organizations across nations, London: Sage Publications. 
Hofstede, G., (1980). Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values. 
California: Sage Publications. 
Hofstede, G., (1983). National cultures in four dimensions: a research-based theory of cultural 
differences among nations. International Studies of Management and Organization, XIII/1-2, 46-74. 
Hofstede, G., (1991). Cultures and organizations: software of the mind. Berkshire: McGraw- Hill. 
Johanson, J., Vahlne, J. E., (1977), ‗The internationalisation process of the firm — a model 
of knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments‘, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 8(1), 23-32. 
Johanson, J., Vahlne, J. E., (2009), ‗The Uppsala internationalization process model 
revisited: From liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership, Journal of International 
Business Studies, 40, 1411-1431 
 32 
Kale, S. H. (1991). Culture-specific marketing communications: an analytical approach, International 
Marketing Review, 8/2, 18-30. 
Kalfadellis, P., Gray, J., (2002), Are proxies valued measures of internationalization?, retrieved on 
November, 19
th
, 2008, from http://www.aueb.gr/deos/EIBA2002.files/Index.htm  
Kogut, B. and Singh, H. (1988). The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 19/3, 411-432. 
Kojima, K. (1973). ―A Macroeconomic Approach to Foreign Direct Investment,‖ Hitotsubashi 
Journal of Economics, 14: 11-21. 
Kojima, K. (1975), ―International Trade and Foreign Driect Investment: Substitute or Complements,‖ 
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 16: 1-12. 
Kojima, K. (1978), ―Direct Foreign Investment: A Japanese Model of Multinational Business 
Operations,‖ London: Croom Helm.  
Kumar, N., (2006), Emerging multinationals: Trends, patterns and determinants of outward 
investment by Indian enterprises‖ RIS Discussion Papers, 117, 1-54. 
Lall, S., (1983). Multinationals from India. In Lall (eds.) The New Multinationals: The Spread of 
Third World Enterprises, New York: John Wiley and sons. 
Lall, S., (1996). The investment development path: some conclusions. In J.H. Dunning and R. Narula 
(eds.) Foreign Direct Investment and Governments: Catalysts for Economic Restructuring, London 
and New York: Routledge, 322-335. 
Mathews, J.A. (2006), Dragon multinationals: New players in 21
st
 century globalisation, Asia Pacific 
Journal of Management, 23, 5-27. 
Meyer, K.E. and Nguyen, H.V. (2005). Foreign investment strategies and sub-national institutions in 
emerging markets: evidence from Vietnam, Journal of Management Studies, 42/1, 62-93. 
Nayyar, D., (2008). The internationalisation of firms from India: Investment, mergers and 
acquisitions, Oxford Development Studies, 36/1, 111- 131.  
Peng, M.W., (2002), Towards an institutional-based view of business strategy, Asia Pacific Journal 
of management, 19, 251-267. 
Pradhan, J. P. and Abraham, V. (2005). Overseas mergers and acquisitions by Indian enterprises: 
Patterns and motivations, Indian Journal of Economics,  LXXXV, 365-386. 
Pradhan, J.P., (2007). Trends and patterns of overseas acquisitions by Indian multinationals, ISID, 
WP 2007/10, 1 -36. 
Ramamurti R. and J. V. Singh (2008). Indian multinationals: Generic internationalisation strategies. 
In Ramamurti R. and J. V. Singh (eds.), Emerging Multinationals from Emerging Markets, 
Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press. 
 33 
Rugman, A. M., (1981). Inside the multinationals-the economics of international markets, London 
and New York: Columbia University Press, 
Rugman, A. M., (1985), Internationalization is still a theory of foreign direct investment, 
Weltwirtschaftsliches, Archiv 121, 570–575. 
Rugman, A. M., (1996). The theory of multinational enterprise: The selected scientific paper of Alan 
M. Rugan, Cheltenam: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Rugman, A.M. and Verbeke, A. (1992). A note on the transnational solution and the transaction cost 
theory of multinational strategic management. Journal of International Business Studies, 23(4): 761-
772.  
Sauvant K. P., (2005). New sources of FDI: The BRICS- outward FDI from Brazil, Russia, India and 
China, Journal of World Investment and Trade, 6/5, 639-709.  
Scott, W. R. (2002), The Changing world of Chinese Enterprises: an Institutional Perspective. In A. 
S. tui and C. M. Lau, (eds.) Management of Enterprise in the people’s Republic of China, Boston: 
Kulwer Academic Press, 59-78. 
Sondergaard, M. (1994). Hofstede's consequences: a study of reviews, citations and replications, 
Organization Studies, 15/3, 447-456. 
Stevens, G.V.G., (1993). Exchange rates and foreign direct investment: a note, International Finance 
Discussion Papers, April, No. 444, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, 
DC. 
Swenson Deborah L. (1994). The impact of US tax reform on FDI in the US, Journal of Public 
Economics, 54, 243 -266 
UNCTAD (2004),  India‘s Outward FDI: a giant awakening?, UNCTAD, New York and Geneva, 
UNCTAD/DITE/IIAB/2004/1, 1- 11 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1981). The Economics of organisation : The transaction cost approach‘, The 
American journal of Sociology, 87/3, 548-577. 
Wright, M., Filatotchev I., Hoskisson, R.E. and Peng, M.W. (2005). Strategy research in emerging 
economies: challenging the conventional wisdom, Journal of Management Studies, 42/1, 1-33. 
 
 
                                                     
i
 Figure is based on data obtained from the TOB financials. Calculations of figures are not within the scope of 
this paper and therefore are not part of the paper. However, information is available on personal request to 
authors. 
 
ii
 Same as i.  
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iii
 The aim of this paper is limited to explore ability of inward FDI flows in promoting outward FDI flows only. 
We understand the relation between inward and outward FDI is not straight forward but the aim of this paper is 
not to look for the various transformations in domestic economy due to inward FDI.  
